Singapore has witnessed its share of accounting scandals over recent years. Many, but by no means all, involved either commodity trading houses or Chinese companies listed in Singapore, otherwise known as S-Chips.
These scandals had implications for Singapore’s reputation as a financial hub and prompted regulatory bodies like the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to enhance oversight mechanisms for listed companies. As Singapore continues to attract international businesses, maintaining robust corporate governance standards will be crucial for preserving investor confidence.
Below follows a list of the most significant accounting scandals to have emerged in Singapore in recent years. We briefly highlight the companies involved, the nature of the fraud, and the consequences faced.
Noble Group
The worst accounting scandal in Singapore’s history is widely regarded to be that involving Noble Group, a Hong Kong-based commodity trader that was once Asia’s largest. This scandal unfolded over several years, culminating in significant regulatory action and financial penalties.
You can read our detailed account of the scandal here. A succinct explanation runs as follows: Founded in 1986, Noble Group quickly became Asia’s largest commodity trader, dealing in energy products and industrial raw materials. At its peak, the company was included in the Fortune Global 500 list. However, growth came at a cost. Margins declined as the company moved away from its core energy trading business.
Moreover, Noble employed an asset-heavy business model that made it vulnerable during periods of declining commodity prices or rising interest rates. As a consequence of these factors, Noble’s financial health worsened as commodity prices declined through the 1990s to the point where margins no longer compensated for the risk inherent in commodity trading. Matters came to a head during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, after which Noble struggled with liquidity issues amid increasing competition.
In 2015, the short-selling firm Iceberg Research accused Noble of manipulating its financial statements. In its initial report, Iceberg claimed that the company employed aggressive accounting practices to inflate the value of assets, specifically the valuation of associates.
In a second report, Iceberg focussed on the divergence between Noble’s net profit and operating cash flows. Iceberg argued that the divergence was primarily due to an increase in the assessed fair value of unrealised commodities contracts. This was essentially Enron-style mark-to-market accounting. Iceberg’s third report detailed how Noble understated its gross and net debt.
In the aftermath of these reports, Noble Group’s market value plummeted. The company lost approximately 43% of its market capitalization, equating to a loss of S$2.6 billion. This decline reflected investor skepticism about the company’s financial health and accounting transparency. Noble recognised almost S$2 billion in impairments in 2017 and the company’s debt was downgraded to junk status. Soon thereafter, the company filed for bankruptcy and underwent a S$3.5 billion debt restructuring, leaving it a shadow of its former self.
Subsequent Investigations resulted in fines of S$12.6 million for releasing misleading information in its financial statements between 2012 and 2016.
Hin Leong
The Hin Leong Trading (HLT) scandal is one of the most significant financial fraud cases in Singapore’s history. HLT, a prominent player in Singapore’s oil trading sector, collapsed in 2020 under the weight of massive debts and fraudulent activities. The scandal primarily involved the founder, Lim Oon Kuin, also known as OK Lim, and his family.
As with Noble Group, HLT faced challenges due to thin margins amid commodity and currency price volatility. In 2020, HLT faced severe liquidity issues after the COVID-19 pandemic caused an historic crash in oil prices linked to a price war among oil-producing nations. This situation led to HLT accumulating approximately US$4 billion in debt owed to over 20 banks.
In April 2020, Lim filed for a six-month debt moratorium to allow HLT time to restructure its finances. As part of this filing, Lim signed an affidavit revealing that the company had concealed US$800 million in futures losses from its financial statements. The revelation prompted investigations by Singaporean authorities and led to Lim’s resignation.
As investigations progressed, it became clear that HLT had engaged in extensive fraudulent practices. The company’s interim judicial managers discovered “highly troubling” irregularities within its operations. These included creating fake sales orders to secure financing against accounts receivable, which ultimately misled banks into believing they were lending against legitimate transactions.
By mid-2020, legal actions were piling up against Lim and his family. In August, Lim was charged with abetment of forgery for cheating banks out of funds through fraudulent means. Over the next year, he faced numerous charges related to forgery and fraud totaling more than 130 counts.
In March 2021, HLT was ordered to wind up due to its inability to recover financially. Subsequently, global banks sought recovery of their losses from Lim and his family members. In December 2022, after lengthy legal battles, Lim consented to a court judgment requiring him and his children to pay US$3.5 billion in connection with HLT’s collapse without admitting fault.
Lim’s criminal trial began in April 2023. He was accused of cheating HSBC out of US$112 million through false invoice-financing applications. In May 2024, he was convicted on three counts related to cheating and forgery and sentenced to serve 17.5 years in prison.
By late December 2022, after acknowledging their inability to pay off the debts incurred by HLT’s collapse, OK Lim and his children formally declared bankruptcy. Their assets are now managed by a trustee as part of the bankruptcy proceedings.
ZenRock
The ZenRock trading scandal involved another Singaporean oil trading firm. As with HLT, this company faced financial difficulty when oil prices crashed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, culminating in its placement under judicial management in May 2020, with debts exceeding S$600 million.
ZenRock Commodities was founded as an oil trading firm in 2014 The founders, including the Chairman Xie Chun, had prior experience in oil trading, notably with Unipec, a major Chinese oil trader.
The discovery of fraud at ZenRock was primarily initiated by Total Oil Trading SA (TOTSA). TOTSA alerted Crédit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank (CACIB) regarding concerns about Zenrock’s financial dealings, specifically pointing out that Zenrock had assigned receivables from a sale contract to another bank and had submitted a fabricated version of its sale contract with TOTSA in support of its application for a letter of credit. The alleged fraud was a complex type of round-tripping transaction.
The alert from TOTSA prompted CACIB to conduct an investigation into Zenrock’s activities. During this investigation, CACIB uncovered discrepancies related to the assignment of receivables and the authenticity of the documents provided by Zenrock. The investigation revealed that Zenrock had engaged in multiple dishonest transactions designed to defraud its financiers, which ultimately led to the company’s placement under judicial management in May 2020 amidst allegations from creditors.
In 2022, Xie Chun and his operations executive Zhang Taiming were charged with multiple offenses including forgery, breach of trust, and cheating valued at over S$100 million. Essentially, it is alleged that the two used forged documents to defraud banks out of funds.
On January 3, 2023, Xie Chun passed away. Following his death, all criminal charges against him were abated by a Singaporean court, meaning that legal proceedings against him ceased without a trial or conviction due to his death. While Xie’s charges were dropped posthumously, Zhang Taiming’s trial is still pending as of February 2025.
Hyflux
Founded by Olivia Lum, Hyflux was a Singaporean company celebrated for its innovations in water treatment technology. The company initially focused on engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contracts within the water sector. By 2008, it had achieved remarkable growth with substantial profits and a strong market presence.
After the financial crisis of 2008, however, the company shifted focus from EPC contracts to operations and maintenance (O&M) contracts, which required ongoing operational responsibilities. This shift exposed Hyflux to greater risk, particularly in relation to a joint power generation and water desalination project known as the Tuaspring project. This complex project failed to yield expected synergies and from 2016 onward, failed to generate profits amid persistently low wholesale energy prices.
By the start of 2018, Hyflux had already lost more than 85% of its peak valuation from 2011. In May, the company announced it was facing financial difficulties, which led to a further significant drop in its share price. The company was unable to secure funding for the Tuaspring Integrated Project and filed for bankruptcy protection. The company owed approximately S$900 million to around 34,000 retail investors who had purchased its perpetuals and preference shares.
Subsequent bankruptcy proceedings revealed discrepancies within the Hyflux accounts and led to subsequent legal actions. The administrators took an impairment charge of S$824 million for the period ending September 30, 2018. This impairment was seen as a consequence of unrealistic electricity price assumptions made in earlier years and suggested that there may have been discrepancies between reported earnings and actual financial performance.
In June 2020, the MAS, Commercial Affairs Department (CAD), and Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA) launched a joint investigation of Hyflux. According to the statement, “The investigation will ascertain whether there were lapses in Hyflux’s disclosures concerning the Tuaspring Integrated Water and Power Project as well as non-compliance with accounting standards between 2011 and 2018.”
It was noted that while Hyflux claimed it did not record a net loss until 2017, it was actually losing money for ordinary shareholders even before that year when accounting for deductions owed to quasi-debt holders.
In November 2022, the former CEO Olivia Lum, the former CFO and other board members were charged with offences under the Securities and Futures Act and the Companies Act for allegedly providing misleading statements about the company’s financial health and failing to disclose critical information regarding the Tuaspring project.
In 2022, Hyflux filed a claim against KPMG, its former auditor, alleging negligence in auditing its financial statements from 2011 to 2017. KPMG denied these allegations, asserting compliance with professional standards during their audits.
Hyflux was fined S$1.6 million by the MAS and legal action is ongoing.
The S-Chips
As noted, the term S-Chips refers to any Singapore-listed company that is incorporated in China. Many of these companies were small and so we prefer to treat them as a group.
S-Chips emerged as a popular investment vehicle in the early 2000s when Chinese investment opportunities were eagerly sought. In the clamor for all things Chinese, many Chinese companies sought to raise capital through listing on foreign exchanges, including the SGX. This trend was motivated by a desire for access to international markets and the perception that Singapore offered a stable regulatory environment. However, almost as soon as these companies began to list, concerns regarding their financial practices began to surface.
Some of the more notable scandals involving S-Chips included:
- China Hongxing Sports Limited, which faced allegations of accounting irregularities in 2011 when it was revealed that the company had inflated its revenue figures. The discrepancies led to a suspension of its shares after they plummeted significantly. Investigations uncovered that the company had misrepresented its financial health, which resulted in substantial losses for shareholders.
- Hongwei Technologies, a polyester fiber manufacturer that admitted to accounting irregularities in 2019, raising red flags regarding its financial statements. Following these revelations, trading of its shares was halted due to concerns over the accuracy of its reported earnings and cash flow.
- Sinomem Technology Limited, which was accused of falsifying financial records related to its operations and sales figures. The company faced scrutiny from regulators after it failed to provide satisfactory explanations for discrepancies in its financial reporting.
- Zhongmin Baihui Retail Group, which was involved in a scandal where it was found that there were significant inconsistencies between reported revenues and actual sales figures. The discrepancies led to investigations by both SGX and other regulatory bodies, ultimately resulting in severe penalties for the company’s executives.
- Longcheer Holdings, which faced allegations of fraud when it was discovered that the company had overstated its revenue through fictitious transactions with related parties. This manipulation of financial statements led to a loss of investor confidence and subsequent legal actions against key personnel within the firm.
- Longtop Financial Technologies, which was found to have fabricated transactions and misrepresented its financial health. This led to severe repercussions, including investigations by regulatory authorities and eventual bankruptcy.
- Sinotech Energy Limited, which faced allegations of accounting irregularities and misleading disclosures about its operations and financial performance, leading to significant losses for investors
These scandals and many others highlighted systemic issues within the S-Chip sector, including inadequate regulatory oversight and poor corporate governance practices. In response, regulators in Singapore took aggressive steps to implement stricter listing rules and increase scrutiny of the disclosures made by S-Chips.
At the height of the Chinese investment boom, there were almost 150 S-Chips, representing more than 15% of the total number of listings. As of 2025, some 37 remain, most operating successfully but many still grapple with trust issues stemming from the historical problems.
The saga of S-Chips serves as a cautionary reminder that financial innovation, such as opening the Singapore market to foreign companies, can lead to corporate governance and transparency problems.
China Sky Chemical Fibre
China Sky Chemical, a chemical company, was also an S-Chip. We thought it might be helpful to illustrate the accounting irregularities of at least one S-Chip company.
The scandal revolved around the actions of the former CEO, Huang Zhong Xuan, who was implicated in making misleading public disclosures and failing to comply with the Securities and Futures Act (SFA) in Singapore.
In February 2012, investigations were initiated by the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) into Huang’s conduct concerning the company’s financial disclosures. The investigations revealed that Huang had made false statements related to China Sky’s acquisition of land in Fujian, China. Specifically, he misrepresented the transaction counterparty as an independent third party when it was actually a related company. Additionally, he provided misleading reasons for delays in transferring land use rights to a subsidiary of China Sky.
As a result of these actions, Huang faced civil penalties imposed by the MAS. In February 2015, he agreed to pay a civil penalty of $2.5 million and offered to surrender 10% of his shareholdings in China Sky, which amounted to approximately 15 million shares. This settlement was notable as it marked one of the first negotiated settlements of its kind in Singapore’s regulatory history, aimed at benefiting existing shareholders by increasing their net asset value per share.
Huang also undertook not to assume any directorial roles or management positions within any entity listed on the Singapore Exchange (SGX) for three years following this settlement. The MAS emphasized its commitment to combat market misconduct and ensure accountability among corporate leaders.
The fallout from this scandal led to significant operational challenges for China Sky Chemical Fibre. Following Huang’s departure and subsequent legal issues, the company faced scrutiny over its financial practices and governance structures. In August 2016, trading of its shares was halted due to ongoing legal issues involving lawsuits filed against two subsidiaries by China Construction Bank. These developments raised questions about the company’s ability to operate as a going concern.
After spending four years reviewing its accounts and finding difficulty addressing regulatory concerns stemming from Huang’s actions, China Sky eventually delisted in June 2021. This was a fairly typical story for an S-Chip facing regulatory concerns.
Asiasons Capital
The Asiasons Capital accounting scandal was part of a larger market manipulation scheme that involved the manipulation of the shares of three companies: Asiasons Capital Limited (now known as Attilan Group Ltd), Blumont Group Ltd and LionGold Corp Ltd. This scandal, which came to light between August 2012 and October 2013, was orchestrated by John Soh Chee Wen and Quah Su-Ling, who were charged with multiple offenses related to market manipulation.
The market manipulation scheme involved an elaborate network of 187 trading accounts that were controlled by Soh and Quah. These accounts were used to create a false appearance of liquidity and demand for the shares of these companies. By executing thousands of manipulative trades, they influenced the supply and price of these stocks in a way that misled investors and financial institutions. In many ways, this was a scaled down version of Hong Kong’s Enigma Network. As with the Enigma Network, the scheme also involved manipulating accounts to attract credit from banks.
During the period in question, trading accounts controlled by Soh and Quah were responsible for almost 90% of all trades in the shares of Asiasons, Blumont and LionGold, grossly inflating the value of these companies.
Once discovered, the fallout from this scandal was severe. It resulted in a loss of nearly S$8 billion in market capitalization across the affected companies when the scheme collapsed in October 2013. The investor reaction also led to a mini-crash in Singapore-listed penny stocks. Financial institutions also suffered substantial losses; it was reported that around $273 million remained unrecovered due to the fraudulent activities perpetrated by Soh and Quah.
In November 2016, both Soh and Quah were charged with multiple counts under Singapore’s Securities and Futures Act (SFA) as well as other legal provisions for their roles in this extensive fraud. They faced charges not only for manipulating share prices but also for cheating financial institutions into extending credit based on manipulated collateral.
In 2022, Soh and Quah were convicted of a total of 180 and 169 charges respectively.
In February 2025, following a lengthy trial process, John Soh received an historic sentence of 36 years in prison—the longest custodial sentence ever given for market manipulation in Singapore—while Quah Su-Ling received a 20-year sentence. The court emphasized the harm caused by their actions as key factors influencing their sentences and sent a chilling reminder of the changed legal and regulatory environment for corporate malfeasance in Singapore.
Swiber
The Swiber scandal revolves around the actions of the offshore oil and gas services contractor, Swiber Holdings, which faced significant legal repercussions due to misleading financial disclosures and insider trading activities. The scandal primarily unfolded in 2016 when the company filed for judicial management and subsequently went into liquidation.
Swiber Holdings was once a prominent player in the offshore oil and gas sector, providing engineering, procurement, construction, installation, and commissioning services. However, as global oil prices began to decline from their highs in 2014, the company’s financial stability deteriorated. In December 2014, Swiber announced that it had secured a US$710 million project award for an offshore field development project in West Africa. This announcement was made during a time when the oil companies were experiencing turmoil due to falling oil prices.
At about this time, the MAS and Singapore police had already begun investigations into Swiber. Investigations revealed that the announcement regarding the US$710 million project was materially false. The company had only signed a letter of intent that authorized expenditure of up to US$2 million on the project, with no binding contract in place. Key executives at Swiber were aware of this discrepancy but proceeded with the announcement anyway.
In 2023, Yeo Chee Neng, who served as CEO and group president at different times during this period, and seven others were finally charged in connection with the scandal.
In 2024, Yeo was fined S$310,000 for his role in this misleading disclosure under Singapore’s Securities and Futures Act (SFA). Other executives including Raymond Kim Goh (the founder) and Francis Wong (former CEO) were also fined S$100,000.
As a result of these actions and subsequent investigations, shareholders suffered significant losses when Swiber eventually ceased trading its shares on the stock exchange. The company’s assets were liquidated over time to pay off debts owed primarily to its main lender, DBS Bank. The protracted judicial management process raised concerns about whether it benefited creditors more than shareholders or employees.
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